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ABSTRACT
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, a 1944 case of first impression 
about the constitutional limitations upon state power to tax airplanes, Justice 
Robert H. Jackson wrote in a concurring opinion that “[p]lanes do not wander 
about in the sky like vagrant clouds.” Rather, “[t]hey move only by federal 
permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified 
personnel and under an intricate system of federal commands.” Indeed, the 
“moment a ship taxies onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and 
detailed system of controls. It takes off only by instruction from the control 
tower, it travels on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its intended 
landing, and it obeys signals and orders. Its privileges, rights, and protection, 
so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone and 
not to any state government.” Indeed, the skies are not open and unlimited 
for general, commercial, and military operations, but rather controlled in 
much the same manner as interstate highways and navigable waterways. 
Whether and how to restrict these global airways has been a concern for both 
American lawmakers domestically and international aviation stakeholders, 
particularly in the post-war 1940s. 
 *  Chair, FIU Law Review Aviation and Space Law Symposium. Assistant Professor, University of 
Central Florida, Department of Legal Studies. Professor Ravich taught at the Florida International 
University College of Law from 2008 to 2014, where he introduced the topic of aviation and space law 
into the curriculum. Aspects of this article were drawn from the author’s invited presentation at the 
International Aviation Management Conference 2014, Emirates Aviation University, Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. Comments are invited at timothy.ravich@ucf.edu or via Twitter @ravichaviation. 
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The international aviation community standardized certain safety 
measures at the Chicago Convention of 1944, but were less successful in 
reaching agreement on economic issues such as protocols allowing foreign 
airlines to fly commercially within another’s territory at prices they set. In 
place of a comprehensive and uniform arrangement for international airline 
operations, bilateral and multilateral agreements have emerged to facilitate 
commercial air travel. Deregulatory impulses have since eroded protectionist 
philosophies in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the United States and 
Europe and other nations have pursued “Open Skies” policies that have 
liberalized wide swaths of international travel. While not entirely free to 
wander about the sky uncontrolled, airliners now journey to more 
destinations, more regularly, less expensively, and with fewer restrictive 
rules.
This Article overviews the seminal issues of “Open Skies” policy, 
including relevant federal laws respecting airline ownership and control. Also 
presented is a review of airline deregulation policy in the United States, 
argument in favor of the expansion of so-called cabotage rights allowing 
foreign carriers to fly domestic routes, and discussion of the emergence of 
strategic airline alliances. Finally, this Article concludes with coverage of an 
intense and brewing controversy between major U.S. airlines, on the one 
hand, and Persian Gulf carriers, on the other hand, that risks Open Skies 
policies in the Middle East. In presenting these issues, this Article aims to 
introduce the reader to the unusual and historically significant ways in which 
aviation laws are derived in the United States and abroad, and in doing so, 
raise a general question about the welfare of aviation consumers overall. In 
conclusion, this Article criticizes U.S. carriers seeking to reverse hard-won 
Open Skies policies, especially given the U.S. airline industry’s habit of 
looking to the government to get out of the way except when it comes to its 
own welfare. Such practice is inconsistent with principles of free 
competition, avoids the real market-borne issue of product competition, and 
is hollow when asserted by carriers who have received substantial protections 
under U.S. bankruptcy law to survive in a global sector that should be 
performance- and not subsidy-based. 
I. INTRODUCTION
When Continental Airlines Flight 28 arrived at Terminal 4 at London’s 
Heathrow Airport on March 30, 2008, at 6:45 a.m., from New York, it was 
decades overdue in the minds of some airline executives.1 Until that time, a 
1 Open Skies Causes a Continental Shift, TRAVEL TRADE GAZETTE (U.K.), Mar. 21, 2008, at 2008 
WLNR 5741461 (quoting Continental Airlines Senior Director for the United Kingdom and Ireland: “The 
world’s premier airport was permanently written out of our brief by the most anti-competitive air service 
agreement, which has protected the incumbents wonderfully.”); see also Michelle Higgins, Open-Skies
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1950s-era pact between the United States and Great Britain strictly restricted 
which foreign airlines could fly commercial airline passengers to Heathrow 
from the United States. Among other carriers, Continental Airlines had been 
excluded from one of the world’s busiest aviation gateways as a result.2 In 
fact, over the last thirty years, only four airlines—British Airways, Virgin 
Atlantic, American Airlines, and United Airlines—were authorized to 
operate between London’s Heathrow Airport and select cities in the United 
States.3 This restriction eased on April 30, 2007, when the United States and 
European Union Member States completed a landmark “Open Skies” treaty 
and ushered in a new era of international air transportation. Open Skies 
effectively liberalized transatlantic commercial airline operations. 
Under the Air Transport Agreement (ATA),4 American and European 
airlines agreed to reciprocal rights to serve city pairs between the 28-nation 
European Union and U.S. markets. The ATA liberalized the number of 
international flights, aircraft, and routes, and it permitted carriers to set fares 
according to market demand. Moreover, it enabled international carriers to 
Promises More Flights to Europe, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 30, 2008, at 2. 
2  In 2008, United Airlines and Continental Airlines announced intentions to merge; the merger 
was completed in 2010. See, e.g., Truly United?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2013, available at http://
www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/09/united-continental-merger.
3  The “Bermuda II” accord is the 1977 agreement between Great Britain and the United States 
permitting only two airlines from each country to serve London Heathrow Airport, prohibiting U.S. 
carriers from serving inter-European routes originating from the United Kingdom, and restricting British 
carriers from servicing points between U.S. cities. 
4  2007 O.J. (L 134) 4-41, 46 I.L.M. 470 (2007), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/e/eu/
114768.htm; see also Adrian Schofield, Will the Skies Stay Open?, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 
7, 2008, at 41. 
As detailed in a May 2008 Massachusetts Institute of Technology International Center for Air 
Transportation White Paper, Stage One of the U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement presents numerous 
opportunities for an air transport market that accounts for more than half of all global scheduled passenger 
traffic: (1) Grants “fifth freedom” rights to all U.S. and EU carriers (both cargo and passenger). For 
example, United Airlines is able to fly from Washington Dulles to Paris and onward to Athens carrying 
Paris-Athens local traffic; (2) U.S. and EU carriers are able to code-share on flights to previously-restricted 
nations (e.g., Greece, Spain), allowing airlines to offer new routings and service to new markets; (3) 
Elimination of the nationality clause allows EU airlines to restructure or consolidate into cross-border 
entities without jeopardizing their right to fly to the U.S. For example, Air France and KLM could merge 
their dual-hub operations to achieve economies of scale without losing their rights into the U.S. (although 
their traffic rights to other countries may be jeopardized); (4) EU airlines are able to offer transatlantic 
services from any location in the EU as a result of elimination of the nationality clause. This will increase 
competition in many markets as every U.S. and EU carrier is eligible to compete in any U.S.-EU market. 
For example, Air France-KLM has begun nonstop service between Los Angeles and London Heathrow, 
which previously was limited to four carriers (two British and two American). Similarly, Lufthansa could 
choose to offer nonstop service between Miami and Barcelona with no connection to Germany; and (5) 
U.S. regulators will consider foreign requests to hold larger shares of non-voting equity, including 
combinations in which the total of voting and non-voting equity exceeds 50 percent. ALEX COSMAS ET 
AL., FRAMING THE DISCUSSION ON REGULATORY LIBERALIZATION: A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF OPEN
SKIES, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 2 (MIT Int’l Ctr. for Air Transp. 2008) [hereinafter STAKEHOLDER
ANALYSIS OF OPEN SKIES, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL].
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enter into cooperative arrangements, including code-sharing, franchising, 
and leasing.5 As important, an “Open Skies” philosophy began to replace the 
outmoded restrictive arrangements of bilateral aviation agreements and 
fostered enhanced regulatory cooperation in the areas of competition law, 
government subsidies, the environment, consumer protection, and security.6
The ATA agreement also welcomed U.S. investors to buy into a European 
Community airline, as long as the airline was majority owned and effectively 
controlled by a member state and/or nationals of member states.7 Similarly, 
the ATA intended to clarify that, under U.S. law, European Union investors 
could hold up to 49.9 percent of the total equity in a U.S. airline and, on a 
case-by-case basis, even more, provided that foreign nationals did not own 
more than 25 percent of the voting stock and the airline remained under the 
actual control of U.S. citizens.8 In all, the ATA was a part of a larger initiative 
by the U.S. Department of State to negotiate Open Skies treaties that gave 
European and American airlines mutual ability and mobility to serve markets 
across the Atlantic Ocean, as frequently as they desired, at prices they 
choose.9
This article outlines the trend in global airline transport between Europe 
and the United States toward liberalized market access and calls for greater 
efforts to allow foreign investors to participate reciprocally in the ownership 
and control of domestic airlines, especially after the global economic crisis 
following September 15, 2008. Within this substantive framework, Part II 
presents the historical background and current regulatory environment 
governing international airline operations and management. Part III 
overviews the salient features of the domestic and international regulatory 
environment in which commercial airlines operate, including an assessment 
of airline deregulation in the United States, impulses to achieve cabotage 
rights, strategic airline alliances, and a significant emerging controversy 
between major U.S. airlines and three Persian Gulf carriers that risks undoing 
open skies accords with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Finally, Part IV 
concludes by offering some recommendations for greater deregulation and 
reliance on market forces in international commercial air transportation. 
5  U.S. Dep’t of State Fact Sheet No. 2007/340, U.S.-E.U. Air Transport Agreement—Open Skies 
Plus (Mar. 9, 2007). Bilateral agreements continue to be a regular feature of international air commerce, 
particularly in Asia. See generally Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Singapore’s New Air Services Agreements with the 




9 See, e.g., Susan Cary, U.S. Airline Clash Over Rivals from Persian Gulf, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 
2015, at B1 (reporting that the U.S. State Department had negotiated 114 open skies agreements since 
1992).
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II. RESTRICTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
Open Skies mean a common aviation marketplace. The main benefit of 
such a regime is unrestricted and mutual access for airlines of different 
nations to international destinations without the burden of capacity 
restrictions.10 Open Skies policies also represent a fresh approach to 
international commercial aviation that should produce public benefits and 
may even increase the competitive health of the domestic aviation market. As 
detailed below, however, despite the theoretical and practical appeal of Open 
Skies, vexing practical, political, and legal issues shadow the subject—
particularly the advent of bilateral agreements and antiquated airline 
ownership and control rules.11
The challenges of Open Skies arrangements originate in world events of 
the last century. International airline service was beginning to take off at the 
end of World War II. At the same time United States lawmakers were looking 
inward, restricting both the ownership and control of its airlines to its own 
citizens. This ownership restriction was predicated upon four grounds: (1) to 
protect and encourage the growth of a fledgling airline industry; (2) to 
regulate international air travel; (3) to restrict foreign access to American 
airspace; and (4) to protect the military’s reliance on commercial airlines to 
supplement military operations. 
Notwithstanding its protectionist philosophy respecting airline 
ownership, the United States advocated in favor of a post-war world in which 
it had complete market access to European and foreign markets.12 The 
aviation opportunities for Americans and Europeans were asymmetrical, 
however. Europe’s airports were all but obliterated as a result of World War 
II while a sophisticated airport infrastructure was emerging in the United 
States. Additionally, as is generally true today, fewer markets existed in 
Europe than in the United States. Any single European nation had one or 
perhaps two primary destinations (e.g., Great Britain has London, France has 
10  In re Defining “Open Skies”, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,130 (Dep’t of Transp. May 5, 1992). See generally 
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The US/EU Open Skies Agreement—Some Issues, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 21 (2007). 
11  While the focus of this article is on U.S-Europe and U.S.-Middle East open skies arrangements, 
streamlining U.S.-Asia routes and stitching together fragmented intra-European aviation operations are 
themselves subjects of significant study and comment. See, e.g., Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Singapore’s New Air 
Services Agreements with the E.U. and the U.K.: Implications for Liberalization in Asia, 73 J. AIR L. &
COM. 351 (2008); Gabriel S. Meyer, U.S.-China Aviation Relations: Flight Path Toward Open Skies, 35 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427 (2005); Garrick L. H. Goo, Deregulation and Liberalization of Air Transport in 
The Pacific Rim: Are They Ready for America’s “Open Skies”?, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 541 (1996); see also
Cathy Buyck, Ambition v. Decision, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 2-15, 2015, at 32 (“[A]fter 
more than 10 years of talks, a single airspace in Europe is not closer to reality.”). 
12  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(23) (“‘[F]oreign air transportation’ means the transportation of passengers 
or property by aircraft as a common carrier for compensation, or the transportation of mail by aircraft, 
between a place in the United States and a place outside the United States when any part of the 
transportation is by aircraft.”). 
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Paris, and Italy has Rome) whereas the United States featured fifty different 
states, each with their own lucrative marketplaces (e.g., Atlanta, Boston, 
Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Miami, New York, Orlando, 
Philadelphia, Phoenix, Seattle, etc.). In this imbalanced context, Heathrow 
was perhaps the only bargaining chip the English had in negotiations with 
Americans for Open Skies rights. The United Kingdom could grant U.S. 
carriers access to Heathrow, but only if the United States stipulated to the 
same rights in various of their markets. As such, “[t]he British[,] who rightly 
feared that the large undamaged aviation infrastructure, commercial fleet, 
and manufacturing capacity of the U.S. would dominate the war ravaged 
systems of Europe[,] saw the U.S. proposal as self-interest masquerading as 
philosophical principle.”13 Consequently, a framework of rules and 
restrictive bilateral and multilateral agreements evolved whereby individual 
nations negotiated accords that controlled the rates, routes, and frequency of 
international airline service.14
“Bermuda I” was the first in a generation of transatlantic bilateral 
agreements. Negotiated in 1946, it permitted the International Air Transport 
Association to establish and control fares and tariffs along international 
routes between the United States and Great Britain.15 More than thirty years 
later, at a time when impulses to deregulate the vast domestic cargo and 
commercial airline industry within the United States were taking hold, the 
agreement was amended by “Bermuda II”16 through which British interests 
13  DAWNA L. RHOADES, EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: PHOENIX RISING 23 (2003). 
14 See, e.g., Jessica Finan, Comment, A New Flight in the International Aviation Industry: The 
Implications of the United States-European Union Open Skies Agreement, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
225, 227 (2008); Stephen D. Rynerson, Everybody Wants to Go to Heaven, but Nobody Wants to Die: The 
Story of the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 421, 422, 427-28 (2002); 
see also EUGENE SOCHOR, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION (1990) (noting that President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had once cautioned against bilateral and multilateral aviation accords, which 
potentially might form “great blocs of closed air [that] trac[ed] in the sky the conditions of future war”). 
15  Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-Gr. Brit.-N-Ir., 15 U.N.T.S. 295. See, e.g., George 
P. Baker, Chairman of U.S. Delegation to the Bermuda Conference, The Bermuda Plan as the Basis for a 
Multilateral Agreement, lecture delivered at McGill University (Apr. 14, 1947), reprinted in ANDREAS F.
LOWENFIELD, AVIATION LAW § 1.13, at 2-9-11 (2d ed. 1981). See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, 
Flights of Fancy and Flights of Fury: Arbitration and Adjudication of Commercial and Political Disputes 
in International Aviation, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 231, 238 (2004); Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: 
Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International Civil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 435 (1994); H. 
A. Wassenbergh, International Air Transport: Regulatory Approaches in the Nineties, 17 AIR & SPACE
L. 69, 74-75 (1992). 
16  Agreement on International Aviation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., July 23, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8641. See
generally Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez & Ivor P. Morgan, Deregulating International Markets: The Examples 
of Aviation and Ocean Shipping, 2 Yale J. on Reg. 107 (1984) (“The United States traditionally has 
encouraged competition in aviation by avoiding agreements that restrict airline capacity and by 
liberalizing the rules governing charter competition. More recently, pro-competitive U.S. policies have 
forced a review of international pricing mechanisms, and the U.S. government has used the threat of 
diverting traffic to neighboring countries to establish more liberal bilateral agreements for aviation. As a 
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leveraged the enormous economic opportunities of London’s Heathrow 
airport, the busiest airport in the European market. Bermuda II strictly capped 
the number of U.S. carriers that could serve Heathrow and “gateway cities” 
in the U.S. from which non-stop service to London could be offered. 
Rigid laws such as “Bermuda II” that manufacture artificial restrictions 
on aviation investment are arcane in today’s networked world.17 As one study 
noted,  
[d]espite today’s trend toward global markets, free trade, the internet, 
and the economic integration of entire continents, one of the most 
globalized, technology-intensive industries remains encumbered by 
rules that stifle competition and prevent airlines, communities, 
passengers, and shippers from benefiting to the fullest. The “bilateral air 
services agreements” . . . that continue to govern much of world trade in 
aviation defined the terms under which airlines will link their two home 
territories. These [bilateral air services agreements] often frustrate 
market growth, force users to pay a premium price, and create a series 
of vested interests.18
Open Skies regimes are replacing the myriad nation-to-nation bilateral and 
multi-state multilateral agreements of the last century, however.19
A.  From Bilateral Agreements to Open Skies 
From a practical and political viewpoint, commercial aviation is a 
paradox. “In terms of its operations, [commercial airline transportation] is the 
most international of industries, yet in terms of ownership and control it is 
almost exclusively national.”20 For example, in the early days of international 
passenger flight, an airline was the de facto representative of the nation under 
whose flag it flew. Privately-owned Pan American Airlines, with its 
“Clipper” fleet, was iconic of the United States in much the same way that 
state-owned Aeroflot represented the former Soviet Union or Alitalia 
represented Italy. More broadly, international aviation symbolized an 
accessible and boundary-less global community. Microsoft CEO Bill Gates 
result, prices and services have generally improved.”). 
17 See, e.g., James Gjerset, Crippling U.S. Airlines: Archaic Interpretations of the Federal Aviation 
Act’s Restrictions on Foreign Capital Investments, 7 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 173, 181-82 (1991). 
18  INTERVISTAS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR SERVICE LIBERALIZATION ES-3 (2006). 
19  Brian F. Havel, US / EU Open Skies Negotiations: The Second Stage Begins, IATA Econ., Apr. 
2008, available at https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Havel_Open_Skies.pdf. 
20  RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19 (2001). See also Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, A New Take-Off for International Air Transport, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 47 (1975) (International 
aviation has been “a serious problem in international relations, affecting the way governments view one 
another, the way individual citizens view their own and foreign countries, and in a variety of direct and 
indirect connections the security arrangements by which we live today.”). 
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captured the sense of global community and seamless mobility that human 
flight has represented from its earliest stage when he said that, “[t]he Wright 
brothers created the single greatest cultural force since the invention of 
writing. The airplane became the first world wide web, bringing people of 
different languages, ideas and values together.”21
As a matter of law, however, international airline operations are 
contained not only by geographical boundaries, but also by policies intended 
to fortify national security, economic, and protectionist concerns. Dating 
back at least to the Paris Convention of 1919, international aviation policies 
have been predicted on the Westphalian principle of exclusive sovereignty 
within the context of airspace. In 1944, more than fifty nations gathered for 
the purpose of creating and implementing a global civil aviation marketplace 
that respected national sovereignty without also hamstringing the 
development of international aviation.22 At this Convention of International 
Civil Aviation commonly referred to as the “Chicago Convention,” delegates 
announced their objectives: 
WHEREAS the development of international civil aviation can greatly 
help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the 
nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to 
the general security; and 
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that 
cooperation between nations and peoples which the peace of the world 
depends;
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments have agreed on certain 
principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation 
may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air 
transport services may be established on the basis of equal opportunity 
and operating soundly and economically[.]23
To implement these goals, Chicago Convention delegates formed the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency 
that was charged with managing international aviation operations.24
21  Gregory P. Sreenan, Aviation Law, 77-JUN. FLA. BAR J. 44, 47-48 (2003). 
22  Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1951 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
23  Int’l Civ. Aviation Org., International Civil Aviation Conference: Chicago, Illinois, 1 Nov. to 7 
Dec. 1994, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf. Modernly, over 190 
nations are signatories to the Chicago Convention and the success of ICAO in establishing international 
technical standards for aircraft (e.g., a series of published Annexes known as International Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs)) is widely recognized. 
24 See International Civil Aviation Organization, A United Nations Specialized Agency, http://
www.icao.int/Pages/default.aspx. 
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While ICAO successfully created international technical standards for 
global aviation,25 it was less successful in achieving its second goal of both 
harmonizing airline economics (e.g., airline rates, fares, frequency, and 
capacity in international commercial aviation) and overcoming restrictions 
on foreign competition in domestic airline markets.26 Instead of agreeing to 
a fully liberalized operational space for commercial airline operations, 
Chicago Convention delegates affirmed “that every State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory”27 and defined 
“five freedoms of the air.” 
The Chicago Convention freedoms include: (1) the right to fly over the 
territory of another country without landing; (2) the right to land in another 
country for technical, non-traffic reasons such as refueling or maintenance; 
(3) the right to discharge traffic from the home country in a foreign country; 
(4) the right to pick up traffic in a foreign country bound for the home 
country; and (5) “beyond rights” or the right to pick up passengers in a 
foreign country and fly them to a different foreign country, provided that the 
flight originated or terminated in the home country.28 Only the first two 
freedoms were annexed to the Chicago Convention, leaving the remaining 
“freedoms” to be negotiated individually between states as restrictive 
bilateral agreements. Under this regime, a complex framework of nearly 
1,500 bilateral agreements between multiple different nations has arisen.29
B.  Airline Ownership and Control 
In 1926 Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act to restrict foreign 
ownership of United States airlines.30 The 1926 Act gave the federal 
government a definitive role in economic and safety aspects of commercial 
aviation by creating the Bureau of Air Commerce and the Civil Aeronautics 
Administration—the ancestor of today’s Federal Aviation Administration—
to develop regulations, enforceable by civil penalties, for the registration and 
25  To this day, ICAO requires communications with air traffic facilities worldwide in the English 
language and establishes international standards for aircraft airworthiness, flight crew certification, and 
radio aids to navigation. 
26  J. SCOTT HAMILTON, PRACTICAL AVIATION LAW 16 (3d ed. 2001). 
27 See supra note 23. 
28 E.g., Bruce Stockfish, Opening Closed Skies: The Prospects for Further Liberalization of Trade 
in International Air Transport Services, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 599, 603-04 n.12 (1992). See also A.J.
THOMAS, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION OF SCHEDULED TRANSPORT 174 (1955). 
29 See, e.g., Berry White, Beginning of a Redefined Industry: How the European Court of Justice’s 
Decision in the Open Skies Case Could Change the Global Aviation Industry, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 267, 269 
(2002).
30  Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (formerly 49 U.S.C. §§ 
171-184 (1951) (repealed 1958). See generally ISABELLE LELIEUR, LAW AND POLICY OF SUBSTANTIAL
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF AIRLINES 32 (2003). 
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licensing of aircraft, and the certification and medical examination of pilots. 
Two years later, Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1928, tying 
airline operations to citizenship. The 1928 law limited who could own an 
aircraft in America by limiting eligibility to register an aircraft to citizens (or 
partnerships of U.S. citizens) or corporations of which the president and at 
least two-thirds of its board members are citizens and at least fifty-one 
percent of the voting shares are controlled by U.S. citizens.31
These laws work in tandem with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 
which requires airlines to demonstrate their “fitness” for operation as a 
function of ownership and control.32 To operate as a U.S. airline, therefore, a 
carrier must first obtain an operating certificate of public convenience from 
the United States Department of Transportation (DOT),33 and, as a 
precondition of that showing, demonstrate its United States citizenship. The 
DOT issues operating certificates only to 
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of its 
possessions, or (b) a partnership of which each members is such an 
individual, or (c) a corporation or association created or organized under 
the laws of the United States or of any State, Territory, or possession of 
the United States, of which the president and two-thirds or more of the 
board of directors and other managing officers thereof are such 
individuals and in which at least 75 per centum of the voting interest is 
31  49 U.S.C. § 44102. See also Fed. Aviation Admin., Aircraft Registry, available at https://
www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/aircraft_certification/aircraft_registry/register_aircraft/. See generally 
Ryan Patanaphan, Note, Navigating the Complex Skies: A Caveat on Liberalizing Foreign Ownership 
Restrictions in U.S. Airlines, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 191 (2011). Under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program 
(CRAF), airlines registered in the United States contract their aircraft and crew for use by the United 
States Department of Defense during emergencies. The commercial airlines receive no compensation for 
their participation unless their fleets are activated for national security purposes, but they are given an 
incentive to participate by being made eligible to bid for peacetime airlift business for which payment is 
made at predetermined rates based on a weighted average of their costs plus a return on investment. The 
Department of Transportation has announced that CRAF will not be impacted if foreign ownership 
restrictions are relaxed. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF OPEN SKIES, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 
4, at 2, 4 n.1. 
32  Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1988)). See
generally Christopher McBay, Airline Deregulation Deserves Another Shot: How Foreign Investment 
Restrictions and Subsidies Actually Hurt the Airline Industry, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 173 (2007); Seth M. 
Warner, Comment, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabotage Restrictions Keep 
Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 307 (1993). For a discussion of the state of foreign 
ownership and control restrictions of the United States cargo industry, see Christopher Furlan, Foreign
Ownership and Control Restrictions in United States Airlines: Barrier to Mergers and Restructurings
(2005), available at http://airlineinfo.com/public/furlan.pdf. 
33  49 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (2008) (“No foreign air carrier shall engage in foreign air transportation 
unless there is in force a permit issued by the board authorizing such a carrier so to engage.”); see also id.
§ 1508(b) (2008) (“[A]ircraft permitted to navigate in the United States . . . shall not take on at any point 
within the United States, persons, property, or mail carried for compensation or hire and destined for 
another point within the United States.”). 
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owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the United States or 
of one of its possessions.34
Ownership of an air carrier by an American citizen is not alone sufficient 
for an airline to obtain DOT operating licensure. Rather, actual control of an 
airline by Americans is a vital consideration for regulators in determining 
whether to allow a carrier to operate in the United States. This recognizes 
national security concerns, but also reflects the fact that most of the world’s 
airlines are government-owned or subsidized.35 Consequently, foreign 
interests cannot have de facto control of an airline, whatever their actual 
ownership share.36
In determining “actual control,” DOT traditionally has evaluated seven 
factors, including supermajority or disproportionate voting rights, negative 
control or power to veto, buy-out clauses, equity ownership, significant 
contacts, credit agreements and debt, and family or business relationship 
between foreigners and U.S. officers.37 “In practice, DOT has interpreted 
control to mean that day-to-day management decisions must be made by U.S. 
citizens, even if there is substantial foreign investment in the airlines. That 
is, the law has been construed as requiring actual control of the enterprise to 
rest with U.S. citizens.”38
Legislators recently considered relaxing ownership and control rules, 
including the rule prohibiting foreign carriers from merging with U.S. airlines 
or foreign investors from purchasing more than twenty-five percent of a U.S. 
airline’s voting rights. For example, in the early 1990s the National 
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry recommended 
34  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15). 
35  For example, of the major international airlines (based on millions of passenger miles flown), 
Aeroflot, Air China, Air France, Air India, Air New Zealand, Alitalia, China Southern Airlines, El Al 
Israel Airlines, Emirates, Finnair, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Malaysia Airlines, Qatar Airways, Saudi 
Arabian Airlines, Scandinavian Airlines System, South African Airways, TAP, Thai Airways, and Turkish 
Airlines are either totally or partially government-owned. AVIATION WEEK. & SPACE TECH. AEROSPACE
SOURCE BOOK 344-381 (2008). Only Air Canada, All Nippon Airways, Asiana Airlines, British Airways, 
Cathay Pacific Airways, China Eastern Airlines, Japan Airlines, Korean Air, Qantas Airways, and Ryanair 
are 100 percent publicly traded. Id.
36 See generally Josh Cavinato, Note, Turbulence in the Airline Industry: Rethinking America’s 
Foreign Ownership Restrictions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 311, 316 n. 27 (2008). Lufthansa German Airlines 
purchased a 19 percent stake in JetBlue in December 2007, representing the first major investment by a 
foreign airline in an American rival since British Airways invested in American Airlines in the early 
1990s. See e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., JetBlue Sells Stake to Lufthansa for $300 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2007, at C2 (“The interest . . . is the latest example of foreign investors leveraging the strength 
of their currencies against the dollar.”). 
37  Review of Data Filed by Certificated or Commuter Air Carriers to Support Continuing Fitness 
Determinations Involving Citizenship Issues, Fed. Reg. 44, 675 (July 30, 2003) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 
pt. 204). 
38  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-34R 2, ISSUES
RELATING TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CONTROL OF U.S. AIRLINES (2003). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 78 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 78 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
09 - RAVICH_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 6:37 PM
504 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:493 
that the 
Federal Aviation Act be amended to allow the U.S. to negotiate bilateral 
agreements that permit foreign investors to hold up to 49 percent voting 
equity in U.S. airlines, providing those bilateral agreements are liberal 
and contain equivalent opportunities for U.S. airlines; the foreign 
investor is not government-owned; there are reciprocal investment 
rights for U.S. airlines, and the investment will advance the national 
interest and the development of a liberal regime for air services.39
DOT itself proposed increasing the stake foreigners might hold in U.S. 
airlines to forty-nine percent, thereby enabling U.S. airlines access to 
international capital markets, encouraging U.S. airlines to develop more 
efficient market driven-networks, creating opportunities for airlines to enter 
into new markets, and achieving consistency with the European Union and 
other bilateral partners’ foreign investment restrictions. 
In all, airline ownership and control rules in the United States are 
byproducts of aviation policies formulated during the middle of the last 
century. While the legal requirement that only American citizens own and 
control an airline traditionally has been viewed as necessary to optimize 
national security and prevent airlines from flying under “flags of 
convenience” in countries with lax safety regulations, such arguments are 
more difficult to sustain in today’s globally networked and interconnected 
marketplace.40
Indeed, strategic alliances between and among airlines have emerged as 
a partial step toward integrating airline operations across borders without 
violating strict ownership and control laws. Long a marketing tool in tourism 
and hospitality industries, strategic alliances have gained prominence in 
today’s airline business. This is particularly true in light of the limitations of 
bilateral agreements and international aviation economic policies. In the 
airline industry strategic alliances have taken the particular form of “code-
share” arrangements. These arrangements allow domestic and foreign 
carriers to pool selected resources, including frequent flyer programs, airport 
lounges, marketing strategies, scheduling, maintenance, revenues, and 
common ownership interests.41
39  NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, CHANGE,
CHALLENGE AND COMPETITION, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 22 (1993). 
40 See generally L. F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience—Does 
the Present Law Pose Special Liability Issues?, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. 63, 64 n.5 (1991); Howard Kass, 
Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy into the Jet Age, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
143, 150 (1994); Ved P. Nanda, Substantial Ownership and Control of International Airlines in the United 
States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 357, 359 (2002); Moritz Ferdinand Scharpenseel, Consequences of E.U. Airline 
Deregulation in the Context of the Global Aviation Market, 22 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 91, 110 (2001). 
41 See, e.g., Stephen B. Moldoff, Union Responses to the Challenges of an Increasingly Globalized 
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While code-sharing is a recent marketing and business strategy, airline 
alliances existed well before airlines were economically deregulated in the 
United States. The first airline partnership may have arisen as far back as the 
1940s when Air France helped to set up airlines in Africa, e.g., Royal Air 
Maroc and Tunisair.42 Airline alliances have grown from simple shared 
agreements at the carrier level to complex networks of dozens of international 
airlines serving hundreds of destinations with thousands of daily flights, for 
example, OneWorld, Sky Team, and Star Alliance. 
Federal law defines “code-sharing” to mean “an arrangement whereby 
a carrier’s designator code is used to identify a flight operated by another 
carrier.”43 A “designator code,” in turn, is a multiple letter character code that 
identifies a particular flight, for example, “UA123” for United Airlines Flight 
123. Code-sharing arrangements are smart business because they offer 
consumers what they want, namely “online” as opposed to “interline” 
connections. An interline itinerary involves travel on one airline from point 
A to point B and on a different airline from point B to point C. In contrast, 
code-sharing provides passengers one-stop shopping by allowing different 
airlines to offer one-stop service from point A to point C, with each airline 
independently setting the price for service between cities that it otherwise 
would not have served. After Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act 
code-sharing arrangements quickly replaced interline service, which declined 
as a percentage of all trips with a connection from about forty percent to a 
mere five percent.44
Several airline industry analysts have concluded that airline alliances 
have reduced fares by about five-to-seven percent on certain city pairs, while 
increasing total traffic by as much as six percent.45 Continental Airlines 
leader Gordon Bethune described the benefits and efficiencies of code-
sharing and airline alliances to Congress in 1998 in connection with a 
proposed alliance with Northwest Airlines: 
The creation of new online options for the U.S. consumer is a key benefit 
of any alliance. Take a market like Madison, Wisconsin. Northwest is 
currently one of nine airlines flying to Madison. Continental does not 
fly to Madison at all. Now let’s consider destinations like Panama City, 
Panama or Midland, Texas. The only online option currently available 
Economy, 5 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 119 (2005). 
42  Ero Vaara et al., Strategies as Discursive Constructions: The Case of Airline Alliances, 41 J. 
MGMT. STUDIES 1 (2004). 
43  14 C.F.R. § 257.3(c). 
44 See e.g., Gustavo Bamberger & Dennis Carlton, Airline Networks and Fares in HANDBOOK OF 
AIRLINE ECONOMICS 269-88 (Darryl Jenkins, ed., 2003). 
45  Gustavo Bamberger et al., An Empirical Investigation of the Competitive Effects of Domestic 
Airline Alliances, 47 J. L. & ECON. 195 (2004). 
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between Madison and these points is American [Airlines]. Continental 
does not serve Madison; Northwest does not serve Panama City or 
Midland. By linking these systems, both airlines now serve these cities 
and offer online connections between them. Competition and choice 
have been created.46
Passengers also may benefit where code-shared flights operate as “single 
carrier” service, e.g., accrual of frequent flier miles and coordinated baggage 
handling. In this sense, lawmakers might reevaluate deregulation policy and 
consider an expansion of cabotage rights while the airlines themselves should 
focus on improving the customer experience in a straightforward way. 
III. DISCUSSION
Liberalized international airline service means economic growth. Some 
aviation industry observers believe that opening international aviation 
markets may stimulate new and better air services, together with traffic and 
job growth. According to one study, the deregulation of transatlantic aviation 
markets between the United States and Great Britain alone would produce an 
estimated twenty-nine percent increase in traffic, generate 117,000 new jobs, 
and produce an increase of approximately $7.8 billion in GDP.47 These 
forecasts are creditable given that the creation of the Single European 
Aviation Market which fused together that region’s commercial airline 
operations in 1993 produced approximately 1.4 million new jobs and doubled 
the traffic growth rate.48 Meanwhile, another study concluded that “air 
service liberalization can promote traffic growth, with an accompanying 
growth in non-aviation sectors . . . [as] the travel and tourism industry drives 
12 percent to 15 percent of the world output of goods and services.”49
Whatever the theoretical and actual economic gains facilitated by 
liberalized aviation operations, the major or “legacy” carriers have not 
responded well to deregulatory impulses, domestically or internationally. 
Service has suffered by almost every account.50 Foreign airlines, such as 
46  Michael J. AuBuchon, Testing the Limits of Federal Tolerance: Strategic Alliances in the 
Airline Industry, 26 Transp. L.J. 219, 222 n.16 (1999). 
47 INTERVISTAS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR SERVICE LIBERALIZATION, supra note 18, at ES-
2. (The INTERVISTAS study was sponsored by such organizations as the Airports Council International, 
Boeing, General Electric, International Air Transport Association, and Pratt & Whitney.). 
48 Id.
49 Id. at ES-5; see also STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF OPEN SKIES, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL,
supra note 4, at 4; EUGENE ALFORD & RICHARD CHAMPLEY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE IMPACT OF 
THE 2007 U.S.-E.U. OPEN SKIES TRANSPORT AGREEMENT 2-3 (2007), available at http://trade.gov/media/
publications/pdf/openskies_2007.pdf.
50 See, e.g., Joe Sharkey, Passengers Rip Airlines Over Service in Zagat Survey, SUN-SENTINEL,
Nov. 20, 2005, at 2 (“‘Would rather take a donkey,’ one [passenger] says. ‘Good service’ translates to, 
‘We won’t bother you if you don’t bother us,’ says another.”). 
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Singapore Airlines or Emirates, regularly top surveys about airlines offering 
the best in-flight amenities and experience—not U.S. airlines.51 Moreover, 
while prices are generally low, they are artificially so, as airlines maintain the 
narrative of cheap travel while “unbundling” services in the form of ancillary 
fees for a la carte items ranging from seat size to baggage checking.52
Meanwhile, every major airline has sought bankruptcy protection (at least 
once). At a certain point, industry will have to confront the reality that 
business practices, not regulations, may be the culprit.53
A.  Assessing Deregulation in the United States 
An examination of U.S. airline deregulation offers an important 
analytical dimension to Open Skies policies and the stances taken by some 
U.S. airlines towards liberalized international operations. The quality of 
domestic commercial airline service has suffered under the policies 
established by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978; it is a perpetual subject 
of spirited concern and debate among travelers and travel industry 
observers.54 Although Congress intended to promote free market competition 
51 See, e.g., World Airline Awards, Top Ten Airlines 2014, available at http://
www.worldairlineawards.com/. 
52 See, e.g., Timothy M. Ravich, National Airline Policy, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 35 (2014) 
(“Going forward, and in the absence of a serious and voluntary effort by the airline industry as a whole to 
differentiate and improve their customer service offerings beyond an artificially low price laden by 
ancillary fees, a national airline policy should delineate direct and not merely derivative customer service 
upgrades—otherwise, re-regulation may be in the offing.”). 
53 See, e.g., Jens Flottau, Accept Reality, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 16–Mar. 1, 2015, 
at 19 (“It is time for the incumbents to accept reality and concede that parts of the market now offer a 
superior produce at competitive prices.”). 
54  Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-504, § 102(7), (10), 92 Stat. 1705, 1706-07 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). The scholarship debating the merits of airline 
deregulation is extensive. See, e.g., Melvin A. Brenner, Airline Deregulation—A Case Study in Public 
Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 179 (1988); KENNETH BUTTON & ROGER STOUGH, AIR TRANSPORT
NETWORKS: THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2000); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & ANDREW R.
GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE MYTHOLOGY (1992); Laurence E. Gesell & Martin 
T. Farris, Airline Deregulation: An Evaluation of Goals and Objectives, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 105 (1992); 
Andrew R. Goetz & Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something Foul in the 
Air, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 927 (1989); Richard D. Gritta, Profitability and Risk in Air Transport: A Case 
for Deregulation, 7 TRANSP. L.J. 197 (1975); WILLIAM A. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA:
EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS (Johns Hopkins Press 1970); Alfred E. Kahn, Airline Deregulation—A 
Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 229 (1988); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation:
Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325 (1990); Theodore P. Harris, The
Disaster of Deregulation, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 87 (1991); Michael E. Levine, Why Weren’t the Airlines 
Reregulated?, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 269 (2006); Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline 
Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981); Kevin P. Mitchell, The
U.S. Airline Industry Fate, 15 KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL’Y 3 (2002); Thomas G. Moore, U.S. Airline 
Deregulation: Its Effects on Passengers, Capital and Labor, 29 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1986); Edward A. 
Morash, Airline Deregulation: Another Look, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 253 (1985); C. Vincent Olson & John 
M. Trapani, III, Who Has Benefited from Regulation of the Airline Industry?, 24 J.L. & ECON. 75 (1981); 
Rose M. Rubin & Justin N. Joy, Where are the Airlines Headed? Implications of Airline Industry Structure 
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and encourage new carriers to readily enter contestable air transportation 
markets, some of the undesirable anticompetitive dynamics that typified the 
airline industry under the governance of the Civil Aeronautics Board from 
1938 to 1978 are present in today’s commercial aviation marketplace.55
Competition that flourished in the early period of deregulation has 
diminished significantly in the last three decades, prompting some members 
of Congress to recognize that “[m]ost of us would not have voted to 
deregulate if we thought it would mean a deterioration to only three 
carriers.”56 In fact, just ten years after implementation of the Deregulation 
Act, Alfred Kahn, a Cornell economist revered as the father of airline 
deregulation, observed that 
[j]ust as one of the most pleasant surprises of the early deregulation 
experience was the large-scale entry of new, highly competitive carriers, 
so probably the most unpleasant one has been the reversal of that 
trend—the departures of almost all of them, the reconcentration of the 
industry both nationally and at the major hubs, the diminishing 
disciplinary effectiveness of potential entry by totally new firms, and 
the increased likelihood, in consequence, of monopolistic exploitation.57
Indeed, in 1986 alone, eighteen national carriers became eight. Over time, 
well-known carriers such as Air California, Air Florida, Braniff, Eastern, Pan 
Am, and National Airlines ceased to exist. Several mergers occurred, 
including Northwest and Republic, TWA and Ozark, USAir and Piedmont, 
and Delta and Western. The first-generation of so-called “low-cost carriers” 
like People Express and New York Air were consumed by conglomerate 
holding companies, including Texas Air.58 Over seventy percent of 
and Change for Consumers, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 215 (2005); Symposium, The Impact of Government 
Regulation on Air Transportation, 9 AKRON L. REV. 629 (1976); GEORGE WILLIAMS, AIRLINE
COMPETITION: DEREGULATION’S MIXED LEGACY (2002); GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
AND THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION (1993). 
55  From 1938 to 1978, Congress regulated airline economics through the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB), which protected an oligopoly of air carriers and restricted market entry in almost the same way 
that Interstate Commerce Committee protected railroad cartels in the late 1800s. Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 917 (1938). See generally Frederick A. Ballard, Federal Regulation of 
Aviation, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1235 (1947); Herbert D. Kelleher, Deregulation and the Troglodytes—How
the Airlines Met Adam Smith, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 299, 304 (1985); SAMUEL B. RICHMOND, REGULATION
AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION (Columbia Univ. Press 1961); Howard C. Westwood & 
Alexander E. Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and 
Afterword, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 311 (1967). 
56  Janet L. Fix, Picture of Airline Deregulation Not as Pretty as It Was Meant to Be, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Feb. 28, 2001, at 26 (quoting Representative Jim Oberstar (D-Minn.)). 
57  Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 318 (1988). 
58 See generally, Paul Stephen Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in Transportation: Monopoly 
Is the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505, 514 (1987); L. Milton Glisson, Is U.S. Domestic Airline 
Competition on a Flight to Oblivion?, 58 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 217, 218 (1991); Robert L. Thornton, Airlines
and Agents: Conflict and the Public Welfare, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 371, 396 (1986) (concluding “[i]f [the 
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commercial airline traffic concentrated at the nations’ twenty-eight largest 
facilities, where dominant carriers operate with limited competition,59 e.g.,
American (formerly USAir) at Charlotte, or Delta at Atlanta and Detroit.60
Meanwhile, airline passengers fume over the poor state of airline service and 
repeatedly call for implementation of an Airline Passengers’ Bill of Rights.61
The modern domestic airline industry is not consistent with the core 
theory of deregulation of perfect market contestability. Instead, mergers and 
consolidation, dominance and near-monoplization of hub-and-spoke 
systems, complex fare structures, frequent flyer programs, predation, 
manipulation of travel agents and computerized reservation systems, firm 
strategies centered around acquisition and maintenance of slots and gates, 
and new entrant casualties, are the norm.62 Three airline bankruptcies—
Skybus, Aloha, and ATA—in the span of one week in 2008 also underscored 
the fragility of the U.S. airline industry.63 After thirty years of airline 
deregulation policy, low prices alone are touted as sufficient justification for 
airline deregulation. Justice Stephen Breyer, who served as an aide to the late 
Senator Edward Kennedy in helping to pass the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978, wrote: 
What does the [airline] industry’s history tell us? Was this effort 
worthwhile? Certainly it shows that every major reform brings about 
new, sometimes unforeseen, problems. No one foresaw the industry’s 
spectacular growth, with the number of air passengers increasing from 
207.5 million in 1974 to 721.1 million [in 2010]. As a result, no one 
foresaw the extent to which new bottlenecks would develop: a flight-
choked Northeast corridor, overcrowded airports, delays, and terrorist 
DOT] fail[s] to act soon, the number of effective competitors in the airline industry may fall below the 
point from which deconcentration is possible without a major crisis”). 
59 See e.g., Laurence Zuckerman, Preserving Hub Networks Is the Carriers’ Motivation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at C1; see also Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Remaining Role for 
Government Policy in the Deregulated Airline Industry, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES:
WHAT’S NEXT 1, 5 (Sam Peltzman et al., eds., 2000). 
60  In April 2008, Delta and Northwest agreed to and sought Congressional approval of an “end-
to-end” merger that would form the world’s largest airline. E.g., Adrian Schofield, Critical Mass,
AVIATION WEEK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 21, 2008, at 24 (“[B]ut even consolidation of this magnitude may 
not streamline the U.S. industry enough to snap it out of a downward spiral.”). 
61  Timothy M. Ravich, Re-Regulation and Airline Passengers’ Rights, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 935 
(2002); Daniel H. Rosenthal, Notes, Legal Turbulence: The Court’s Misconstrual of the Airline 
Deregulation Act’s Preemption Clause and the Effect on Passengers’ Rights, 51 DUKE L.J. 1857 (2002). 
62  Bettina M. Whyte & Michael B. Cox, Airline Industry Restructuring: From Stuck in the Mud to 
Flying High, 16-JUN. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 25 (1997) (“Since 1978, airline deregulation in the United 
States has been characterized by periods of over-capacity, bankruptcy, price discounting, fuel shortages, 
labor strife, government intervention, as well as the free market consequences of management mistakes.”). 
63 E.g., Andrew Compart, Free Fall, AVIATION WEEK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 14, 2008, at 57 
(“Fuel, a troubled economy and tight credit markets have left airlines with a much smaller margin for 
error, and the rapid succession of bankruptcies highlights just how fragile the industry is.”). 
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risks consequently making air travel increasingly difficult. Nor did 
anyone foresee the extent to which change might unfairly harm workers 
in the industry. 
Still, fares have come down. Airline revenue per passenger mile has 
declined from an inflation-adjusted 33.3 cents in 1974, to 13 cents in the 
first half of 2010. In 1974 the cheapest round-trip New York-Los 
Angeles flight (in inflation-adjusted dollars) that regulators would 
allow: $1,442. Today one can fly that same route for $268. That is why 
the number of travelers has gone way up. 
So we sit in crowded planes, munch potato chips, flare up when the 
loudspeaker announces yet another flight delay. But how many now will 
vote to go back to the “good old days” of paying high, regulated prices 
for better service? Even among business travelers, who wants to pay 
“full fare for the briefcase?”64
Nevertheless, strained balance sheets, together with the poor state of 
airline customer service in the deregulated area, suggest that an infusion of 
foreign capital and service may improve the quality and experience of 
domestic passengers.65
B.  Cabotage: Foreign Carriers, Domestic Routes 
Stimulating cabotage rights as a supplement to Open Skies and in place 
of existing bilateral and multilateral agreement may stimulate competition in 
today’s saturated domestic airline marketplace. Cabotage—an admiralty 
term—refers to the ability of a carrier to transport passengers, mail, or cargo 
between ports within a foreign country market.66 In aviation, for example, 
64  Stephen G. Breyer, Airline Deregulation, Revisited, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 20, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2011-01-20/airline-deregulation-revisitedbusinessweek-
business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
65 E.g., Z. Joseph Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in the International Air 
Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 51, 58 (1982). Several smaller market countries that required 
infusions of capital, including El Salvador, resisted the nationalistic operation and control requirements 
of Bermuda I. E.g., Marc L.J. Dierikx, Bermuda Bias: Substantial Ownership and Effective Control 45 
Years On, 16 AIR L. 118, 120 (1991). 
66  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 194 (7th ed. 1999). “Cabotage meant originally navigation and 
trade along the same stretch of coast between the parts thereof, such coast belonging to the same State.” 
Id.; see also Douglas R. Lewis, Note, Air Cabotage: Historical and Modern-Day Perspectives, 45 J. AIR
L. & COM. 1059 (1980); see, e.g., Kirsten Böhmann, The Ownership and Control Requirement in U.S. 
and European Union Air Law and U.S. Maritime Law—Policy; Consideration; Comparison, 66 J. AIR L.
& COM. 689, 690 n. 3 (2001) (noting that “[c]abotage is commonly defined as carriage of passengers and 
goods between two points within the territory of the same nation for compensation or hire”); Eli A. 
Friedman, Comment, Airline Antitrust: Getting Past the Oligopoly Problem, 9 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
121, 143 (2001) (contending that “[t]he only way that a competitive, growing market can take hold with 
a considerable, long-term effect on price and service is if domestic and foreign airlines are able to 
individually establish competing hub and spoke systems on a domestic and international level, while in 
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British Airways would enjoy cabotage rights in the United States if it were 
permitted to offer service from Miami, Florida to Albany, New York without 
any connection to Great Britain. Similarly, a United States carrier would have 
cabotage rights in Italy if it could fly passengers, mail or cargo from Milan 
to Rome, without any connection to the United States. Dating back to the 
1920s, however, Congress has protected domestic airlines from competition 
by prohibiting cabotage by foreign carriers within the United States, and 
cabotage is not otherwise available to United States carriers abroad.67
International law restricts cabotage rights, likewise. Article VII of the 
Chicago Convention expressly restricts cabotage. This limitation is 
predicated upon the concept of national sovereignty, whereby any signatory 
to the Chicago Convention has the right to withhold cabotage rights to any 
other single state: 
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the 
aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, 
mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another 
point within its territory. Each contracting State undertakes not to enter 
into any arrangements, which specifically grant any such privilege on 
an exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, and 
not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other State.68
While interpretation of the word “specifically” and the phrase “an exclusive 
basis” is a subject of debate, the United States has viewed cabotage rights as 
a matter of “sovereign, unilateral judgment,” and determined that conferring 
cabotage rights to one nation does not require cabotage rights to all nations.69
Consequently, few circumstances exist for cabotage rights in the United 
States.
The International Air Transportation Act of 1979 offers some hope in 
this regard, as it allows limited cabotage rights, namely the right of foreign 
carriers to fly within the United States where an “unusual circumstances” 
compliance with the antitrust laws”); W.M. Sheehan, Comment, Air Cabotage and the Chicago 
Convention, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1950). 
67  S. REP. NO. 1661, at 2 (1938); see also Jonathan B. Wilson, Note, The Lessons of Airline 
Deregulation and the Challenge of Foreign Ownership of U.S. Air Carriers, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L.
& ECON. 103, 111-12 (1990). 
68  Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 7. The Paris Convention of 1919, which was the first 
multinational convention on aviation, expanded the concept of maritime cabotage to the aviation industry. 
Convention Relating to the Regulation of the Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1979, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 (1919). 
See F. Allen Bliss, Note, Rethinking Restrictions on Cabotage: Moving to Free Trade in Passenger 
Aviation, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 382, 384 n.9 (1994). 
69  Lewis, supra note 66, at 1063-64; see also Z. Joseph Gertler, Towards a New, Rational and 
Fair Exchange of Opportunities for Airlines, in EEC AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND REGULATION AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA 199, 202-03 (Peter P.C. Haanappel et al. eds., 1990); Kass, 
supra note 40, at 152-53. 
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exist.70 In this context, DOT 
may . . . to the extent it finds that such action is required in the public 
interest, exempt any foreign air carrier for a period not to exceed 30 
days . . . to the extent necessary to authorize a foreign air carrier to carry 
passengers, cargo, or mail in interstate or overseas air transportation in 
certain markets if [it] . . . finds that because of an emergency created by 
unusual circumstances not arising in the normal course of business, 
traffic in such markets cannot be accommodated by air carriers . . . .71
DOT exceptions under the Air Transportation Competition Act are quite rare, 
however.72
In light of qualitative service deficiencies by many domestic carriers, 
perhaps the time has come for the enactment of laws that allow non-U.S. air 
carriers to serve domestic routes, a move that may inject needed capital and 
competition into the deregulated marketplace. Cabotage rights also may 
make sense given the way in which the airline market has been developing: 
Domestic markets could be left to low-cost carriers [such as JetBlue, 
Southwest, Frontier, and Allegiant]. International service would become 
the province of large multinational entities. The European fear that such 
an entity would be dominated by the U.S. mega-carriers is growing less 
likely given the financial weakness of U.S. carriers and the fact that the 
U.S. market is expected to recover more slowly than the rest of the world 
in terms of passenger and cargo traffic. Historically, U.S. carriers were 
thought to gain power from the fact that they brought with them a large 
domestic network, but this too is becoming less important as the 
domestic market shifts towards low-cost carriers.73
All this said, the events of September 11, 2001 raise a number of 
potential issues, including national security, that militate against liberalized 
cabotage rights.74 Moreover, labor generally opposes cabotage, 
characterizing such rights as non-negotiable rights that “could destroy the 
ability of some U.S. airlines to compete and cause them to be replaced by 
foreign air carriers on both international and domestic routes [and] raise 
serious questions of safety and security in the minds of lawmakers who are 
70  International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. § 1386 (1992). 
71 Id.
72  For example, the United States Department of Transportation denied Lineas Aereas Del Caribe, 
S.A. the right to carry 90 cattle between Florida and Puerto Rico. DOT Order 86-8-37 (Aug. 15, 1986). 
73  RHOADES, supra note 13, at 186. 
74  Cavinato, supra note 36, at 350 (“Rethinking and retooling an almost century-old restriction, 
whose original justifications are either irrelevant or adequately addressable, is necessary if the U.S. airlines 
are to regain their leadership role in the global aviation.”); see, e.g., Timothy M. Ravich, Is Airline 
Passenger Profiling Necessary?, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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concerned with protecting the traveling public.”75
Also, with respect to transatlantic aviation, cabotage may be a non-
starter given the disparity between the U.S. marketplace and everywhere else. 
That is, access to ownership of a U.S. domestic carrier is not equivalent to 
any reciprocal right to own and operate a European carrier. Simply, “[a]ccess 
to the huge American passenger aviation market through indirect cabotage is 
such a bonanza . . . that even open access to landing slots and flight routes to 
Europe are paltry rewards in comparison.”76 Indeed, at the Chicago 
Convention of 1944, the United States essentially offered a global free market 
for airlines if nations could agree to recognize the “five freedoms.” That offer 
was resisted as national security interests trumped free-market impulses. 
Indeed,
in late 1944 the United States was on the verge of being in position to 
monopolize the international airline industry at war’s end. It would take 
little more than a change of paint and uniforms to transform the U.S. 
military airlift fleet into civil airlines having a greater capacity than all 
of the other nations on earth could hope to muster for many years.77
C.  Reversing Open Skies? The Gulf Carrier Threat 
In 1999, the United States reached an Open Skies deal with the United 
Arab Emirates, home to Emirates Airline and Eithad Airways. Two years 
later, in 2001, Qatar and the United States reached a similar accord. Since 
that time, the trio of state-owned Persian Airlines—Emirates, Eithad, and 
Qatar—have expanded rapidly, using hubs in Abu Dhabi and Doha to cut 
into the market share of U.S. carriers on choice international routes.78 In fact, 
the customer experience on the Persian carriers—including wide-body 
planes, low fares, and in-flight amenities—is so attractive that passengers 
traveling from the United States to Asia will book their flights with a stop-
over in Dubai rather than take nonstop service offered by U.S. carriers. 
Recent scholarship has examined how Gulf carrier competition has 
affected U.S. carriers’ traffic volumes and fare levels in international route 
markets. While consumer welfare has been enhanced, legacy carriers in the 
United States and Europe are threatened: 
75  Thomas D. Grant, Foreign Takeovers of United States Airlines: Free Trade Process in the 
Airline Industry, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 114, 133 n.236 (1993) (referencing AFL-CIO Executive 
Council, Foreign Control of U.S. Aviation Industry, Bal Harbour, Florida (Feb. 22, 1991)). 
76  Grant, supra note 75, at 114 n.153 (1993) (referencing AFL-CIO Executive Council, Foreign 
Control of U.S. Aviation Industry, Bal Harbour, Florida (Feb. 22, 1991)). 
77  HAMILTON, supra note 26, at 16. 
78 See generally Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Civil Aviation in the United Arab Emirates—Some Legal 
and Commercial Perspectives, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 15 n.11 (2008). 
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First, Gulf carrier competition directly impacts route markets 
connecting the U.S. to the Middle East, such as the Washington Dulles 
to Dubai route, served by both Emirates and United Airlines. Moreover 
there is a secondary effect since Gulf carriers transport passengers 
through their Middle East hubs to beyond markets (i.e., sixth freedom 
traffic), thus impacting affects U.S. carrier operations to cities in Africa, 
Asia, Australia, and Europe. This secondary effect is significant since 
the majority of the Gulf carriers’ passengers connect to beyond markets.
[Second,] the empirical results suggest that . . . a 1% growth in total Gulf 
carrier traffic to or from the U.S. is associated with a less than 0.1% drop 
in U.S. carriers’ international passenger traffic and a less than 0.1% 
decrease in air fares. From a consumer perspective, the latter is, of 
course, a desirable outcome of increased competition in international 
aviation markets. U.S. carriers, however, are likely worse off following 
Gulf carrier entry.79
American and European carriers have reacted to these circumstances more 
aggressively—by resorting to political and legal process as much or more 
than making improvements to customer service. 
In December 2014, Air France-KLM and Lufthansa Group wrote the 
European Commission to criticize “the absence of a level playing field 
regarding the access of certain government-supported third-country carriers 
to the European Aviation Market . . . if the development is allowed to 
continue, both the economic and strategic role of European aviation will be 
permanently impaired.”80 According to one assessment: 
The European airline CEOs want a ‘proposal for a revised and efficient 
defense instrument safeguarding fair competition in the European 
aviation market vis-à-vis third-country carriers.’ They also are asking 
for strict enforcement of ownership and control regulations and are 
proposing an international dispute settlement mechanism for conflicts 
over fair competition. In essence, the European carriers are demanding 
the right for Europe to withhold traffic rights from Gulf carriers they 
believe care government-subsidized.81
79  Martin Dresner et al., The Impact of Gulf Carrier Competition on U.S. Airlines, available at 
https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2015conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=409 (emphasis added). 
80 See Madhu Unnikrishnan & Jens Flottau, Backing Up, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb–
Mar. 2015, at 40. 
81 Id. (Noting that the views shared by the CEOs of Europe’s largest carriers are not shared by all: 
“In fact, powerful players are actually in favor of supporting the Gulf airlines[, which] are hugely 
important customers for Airbus and Boeing, which have a keen interest in the airline being able to continue 
their path. And non-hub airports, particularly in Europe, see the three Gulf carriers as their only 
opportunity to attract long-haul air service and grow passenger numbers as European legacy airlines focus 
on their own hubs.”). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 84 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 84 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
09 - RAVICH_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 6:37 PM
2015] Open Skies 515 
Airlines in the United States have asserted similar arguments designed 
to roll back or reverse Open Skies agreements with the UAE and Qatar. In 
January 2015, American Airlines Group, Inc., United Continental Holdings, 
Inc., and Delta Air Lines, Inc. distributed a fifty-five page briefing paper 
detailing how the state-owned Gulf carriers were dumping capacity on routes 
between the U.S. and the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and otherwise 
distorting global trade with the help of huge government subsidies.82 The 
clash has been bitter and sheds light on important aeropolitical and 
protectionist impulses that shadow modern international airline operations.83
A fortiori, they expose a disturbing pattern by some U.S. airlines to devalue 
trade principles when the consequences are painful: 
The U.S. carriers want capacity between Gulf States and the U.S. to be 
reduced to local demand. Yet it should be up to any company to 
determine whether it wants to pursue connecting traffic . . . . And then 
there is this issue of “fair competition” that European and U.S. majors 
argue should link traffic rights to the absence of subsidies. While it is 
true that access to enormous financial support from the state . . . can 
distort competition, other factors can do the same harm . . . . Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection in the U.S. is an incredibly powerful tool for 
airlines (and other companies) to reduce structural costs [and] it is a tool 
not available to carriers outside the U.S.  
***
Reversing open skies is clearly not the answer, and one can only hope 
that governments stand firm.84
82 See Partnership for Open & Fair Skies, Fueled by Massive Government Subsidies, State-Owned 
Qatar Airways, Etihad Airways and Emirates are Aiming to Dominate Global Aviation by Exploiting 
Open Skies Policy (2015), http://www.openandfairskies.com/. See generally Mike Tretheway & Robert 
Andriulatis, What Do We Mean by a Level Playing Field (2015), available at http://
www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/DiscussionPapers/DP201506.pdf. 
83  Susan Carey, U.S. Airlines Clash Over Rivals from Persian Gulf, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2015, 
at B1. The sharp rhetoric surrounding the charge of unfair competition has been amplified by unfortunate 
remarks about the terrorism of September 11th and terrorism originating in the Middle East to rebut the 
criticism leveled by several organizations, including Airports Council International North America, U.S. 
Travel Association, and Business Travel Coalition, that the three complaining U.S. airlines by pointing 
out that such carriers benefitted from government subsidies after the September 11 attacks. Id. at B2 
(Reporting the comments of Delta CEO Richard Anderson: “It’s a great irony to have the UAE from the 
Arabian Peninsula talk about that given the fact that our industry was really shocked by the terrorism of 
9/11, which came from terrorists from the Arabian Peninsula;” Qatar Airway’s CEO said that Mr. 
Anderson “should be ashamed to bring the issue of terrorism to try to cover his inefficiency in running an 
airline.”); see also 27 Questions the Big 3 Need to Answer in Seeking Government Protection from Foreign 
Airlines, BUS. TRAVEL COALITION (Mar. 5, 2015), http://businesstravelcoalition.com/cgi-bin/dada/
mail.cgi/archive/influencers/20150305162148/.
84  Flottau, supra note 53, at 19. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
While not going as far as providing cabotage freedoms, Open Skies 
policies have been enormously successful and a welcome departure from 
piecemeal bilateral agreements and antiquated ownership and control rules. 
Low-cost carrier JetBlue, itself a successful product of airline deregulation, 
could not have achieved success in serving the Caribbean and Latin America 
but for Open Skies, for example.85 And as JetBlue’s president noted: 
“[s]imilar to the domestic aviation landscape after deregulation, international 
services, traffic, and economic activity have correspondingly grown since the 
United States began pursuing its open-skies policies.” Free trade policies in 
the aviation industry have indeed eliminated “government interference in 
commercial decisions on routes, capacity, and pricing.”86 Measured against 
this success, the protectionist position now taken by certain U.S. airlines in 
connection with robust competition from carriers in the Middle East is 
troubling.
The practice by some airlines of favoring deregulation when it comes to 
their customer service obligations while crying for government action when 
it comes to their own welfare is not pro- or anti-regulation, but simply self-
serving.87 Perhaps the comments of one aviation industry observer in this 
context are unsurprising given certain carriers’ vacillation between Open 
Skies and deregulation, on the one hand, and restricted Open Skies and re-
regulation, on the other hand: “[i]t was, after all, the airlines themselves who 
invited the government to impose regulation in order to save them from 
competition, and only United among the then trunk carriers supported 
deregulation in 1978.”88
For now, the position taken by five of the largest airlines in the world is 
nothing short of pure protectionism that is out of step with today’s global 
marketplace. Indeed, 
[T]hey want their governments to protect them from new market 
entrants that are beginning to dominate one part of the long-haul 
market—traffic to, from and between Southeast Asia, the Middle East, 
Europe, Africa and Australia. Gulf carriers are also growing their 
presence in North America, based upon long-established open skies 
deals for which the U.S. side has been pushing. 
85  Unnikrishnan & Flottau, supra note 80, at 41. 
86 Id.
87  Ravich, National Airline Policy, supra note 53, at 1. 
88  Michele McDonald, Trouble on the Hill; Congress Considers Possible Airline Regulations, AIR
TRANSP. WORLD, June 1, 2001, at 95. 
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The demands by United, American, Delta, Lufthansa and Air France-
KLM are in pursuit of their interests only and have nothing to do with 
the principles of free competition.89
89  Flottau, supra note 53, at 19. As this article went to publication, the U.S. Department of Justice 
raised concerns about demands by U.S. airlines that the federal government limit flights of three Middle 
Eastern rivals, warning of higher fares and fewer choices for airline passengers. See generally Jeffrey 
Dastin, U.S. Airlines hit Justice Department Hurdle in Gulf Trade Dispute, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-airlines-gulf-exclusive-idUSKCN0S621P20151012#KdzWoejhxS 
4X3rbI.97; see also Emirates Airlines, Emirates’ Response to Claims Raised about State-Owned Airline 
in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (June 29, 2015), http://content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/
openskies_rebuttal/EK_Response_Main.pdf.
